Actually, there were almost as many 'class divisions' as there were races at Brooklands in 1907, the rules changed (if mostly marginally) from event to event until the introduction of the 'standard' classes for four-inch, five-inch, six-one-eighth and seven-a-half inch cars in fall. I count a total of 35 races (including all heat, match, handicap, "claimer" and one-make races) during the five meetings in its inaugural year, which produced twenty different winners from twelve different manufacturers, so the variety was there, no problem. Also, "the fastest car would always win", isn't that the main objective of motor racing, as a sport, in the first place? Attendance wasn't very high, reportedly between 2,000 for the Summer meeting and 10,000 for the one in September, but it was generally adjudged adequate, and produced cash flow, along with the 1-sovereign admission fee to the 'enclosure', an early form of paddock pass. Would an 'American-type' press agent have helped to draw in the crowds? How many people in the area were willing and able to pay so much money for a motor race meeting? I suspect that was a big part of the problem, the circuit management addressed potential customers from the nearby city and was looking for affluent people with the means to purchase a car, not necessarily for big numbers. 'The right crowd, and no crowding' probably had its roots in this early policy of admission prices, and together with a few other Brooklands peculiarities it eventually doomed the whole project.
Looking at it from the perspective of 1907, and trying not to take every statement (especially by car manufacturers!) at face value, one has to consider the following: 1) motor racing had already proven popular, with huge crowds at many events in the past, 2) manufacturers were finding races a useful tool for testing of existing hardware as well as new ideas and, not least of all, publicity. Would motor racing have survived without manufacturer support? Definitely, it had lots of appeal for spectators as well as competitors, but it may have taken a few more extra turns for it to find its feet, especially in the wake of events like Paris-Madrid or other PR disasters of that ilk. The car clubs did their work, of course, but in those years they were often merely acting as lobbyists for the industry as a whole, so primarily another component in the tool box of the manufactureres, and the big question of the time was: WHERE can we go racing on a REGULAR basis? Road racing was generally fine, but there were problems with availability and sustainability on a long term basis, while racing on horse tracks had so many disadvantages that it was barely even tried this side of the big pond. Governments were reluctant to put up big public money, despite all lobbying, and that wouldn't change much until the Nürburgring was built twenty years later (which was a wonderous thing in itself, and - as a public enterprise - is so far still inadequately covered in enough detail!).
No, the only way forward was a permanent track built by private enterprise, with the industry 'pledging' support, of course - always going to be a 'tricky' thing! And let's not forget, the track paving (sorry, Doug - surfacing!) was another item that had to be tested, along with the cars, as it was by no means clear yet which way to go forward on that matter, also for roads! I don't go along at all with the above quoted sentiment that the Brooklands track surface was a problem, not until many years later, and more to do with (a lack of) maintenance and upkeep than any inherent fault of the concept. In fact, concrete is still used today in the building of motorways in this country and several others, and though it does have its problems it's by no means a no-go. Period articles, especially from the US make it clear that the motoring world was expectantly watching the 'experiment' in England in order to draw conclusions. And, in much the same way as at Weybridge, new 'speedways' were built in the US over the following years, incidentally with a lively mix of surfacing: Indianapolis, Atlanta, Playa del Rey...
Basically all of them failed, many within a very short time, except for Indianapolis. Richard is right in saying that even that track had its problems during the twenties, but it wasn't exactly "saved by the junk formula" as much as it was able to survive in spite of it, as I have tried to demonstrate in another thread on this forum. But Indianapolis serves well as an example of how these things can go wrong, as it was built with similar objectives to the Brooklands track - in those days, the city of Indianapolis was the centre of automotive production in the US, and it was deemed advisable to provide the local car companies with a track on which to test their products, only for those same companies to fail to put the money where their mouth was - there was hardly any industry testing activity going on at Indianapolis, ever! So, how DID the track survive? By the clever (or: lucky?) idea of the track management to stage 'autoracing for the masses': the Indy 500 was a cash cow from day one, and knew only one way of development, it grew and grew and grew over the years. The only kink in the road was the fact that Carl Fisher had tired of his own success by the early twenties, and his vivid imagination had long since taken another direction for him to follow, but the business model was as sound as ever, and proved to be just that in the hands of its next owner.
And Brooklands? You can find within period newspapers in the Letters to the Editor section glowing acclaim for Brooklands, and within even half of the first sentence you recognize the unmistakable style and know that the letter will be signed, "S. F. Edge", yet even Napier stopped any serious activity at the track soon after 1907, while other manufacturers basically didn't even bother to start. Testing at Brooklands was a dead duck in the water, right from the beginning, and it's the same old story: companies (and especially car companies) encourage private and public enterprise to build infrastructure they don't really need, but would like to have if somebody else could be found to put up the money! In Locke King they found the proper dunce to pick up the bill, and that was basically as far as their interest in the project took them, with the ultimate verdict: "No, we don't really need it, after all". All that was left for Brooklands was a bunch of society rich kids, with an assortment of fast cars, eager to spend a few weekends between hunting trips with a mix of high-speed pissing contests and binge betting. The beginning of the Historic Racing scene? Perhaps, but hardly mattering at all to the outside world.
By some coincidence, 1907 also saw the first professional motorcycle races taking place in the Isle of Man, after earlier 'tests' there to determine the British contingent for the 1905 International Cup races in France, similar to the Gordon-Bennett elimination trials for cars the day before. While the roads on the Manx island had been used extensively for the "Tourist Trophy" car races over the next few years, and occasionally thereafter, the 'bikes' took the Island by storm, and never left. The result? TOTAL BRITISH DOMINATION of worldwide motorcycle racing and production over the next half century, nothing less! How did the British auto industry look at the 'bikies'? Could they have done as well if not for Brooklands?? Bad management???
(me, one of the 'pioneers' of expansive newspaper research for motor racing history! - double 
